

Notes

Introduction

1. The notion of “interdisciplinarity” tends to indicate a prior agreement on the object of research and perhaps on an integrated research method, which is not available for aesthetics. Nonetheless, much of what has been said in favor of interdisciplinarity applies to the notion of cross-disciplinarity as well. See for example Ivan Gaskell’s article on the official Web site of the American Society for Aesthetics, <http://www.aesthetics-online.org/articles> (accessed May 10, 2008).

2. See Hegel’s equation of aesthetics and philosophy of art at the very beginning of his aesthetics lectures, *Hegel’s Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).

3. Recent defenses of this approach have included Mary Mothersill, *Beauty Restored* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Nick Zangwill, *The Metaphysics of Beauty* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); and, perhaps surprisingly, Arthur C. Danto, *The Abuse of Beauty* (Chicago: Open Court, 2003).

4. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (London: Routledge, 1984); and Terry Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

5. This connects with the very beginnings of the discipline. See Alexander Baumgarten, *Aesthetica* (1750/1758), vol. 1, trans. and ed. into German by Dagmar Mirbach in a Latin-German edition (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 2007), p. 58. Recently, Carolyn Korsmeyer has asked whether the disgusting might replace concerns with the beautiful and the sublime. See Carolyn Korsmeyer, *Gender and Aesthetics* (London: Routledge, 2004).

6. The recent “Philistine Controversy” is paradigmatic here. See D. Beech, J. Roberts, eds., *The Philistine Controversy* (London: Verso, 2002), p. 13.

7. The idea of *Kunstwissenschaft* (the scientific, rigorous, or systematic study of art) runs through the work of the founding fathers of modern art history: Heinrich Wölfflin and Alois Riegl and the later work of Erwin Panofsky and Ernst Gombrich. For its manifesto

see Hans Sedlmayr, “Toward A Rigorous Study of Art,” (1931) in *The Vienna School Reader*, ed. C. Wood (New York: Zone Books, 2000), pp. 131–80.

8. Rosalind E. Krauss, “Using Language to Do Business as Usual,” in *Visual Theory: Painting and Interpretation*, ed. N. Bryson, M. A. Holly, K. Moxey (New York: Harper-Collins, 1991), pp. 79–94.

9. See Michael Ann Holly, *Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Michael Podro, *The Critical Historians of Art* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984); Eric Fernie, *Art History and Its Methods* (Boston: Phaidon Press, 1995); Donald Preziosi, *The Art of Art History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Paul Crowther, *The Transhistorical Image* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

10. W.J.T. Mitchell, *What Do Pictures Want?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

11. “New art history” refers to contextualist approaches (chiefly Marxist, feminist, semiological, structuralist, and psychoanalytic) that, in the 1980s, began to criticize institutional art history (e.g., by uncovering art history’s own aesthetic presumptions). See Jonathan Harris, *The New Art History: A Critical Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2001).

12. Following Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Elizabeth Prettejohn speaks of a “kind of collaboration between the viewer and the work,” in which aesthetic reflection provides a link between the past and present that emerges only from a direct encounter with aesthetic objects by a perceiving subject. See Elizabeth Prettejohn, *Beauty and Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 22.

13. What Passmore found “dreary” was precisely the tendency of many aestheticians to abstract from the particularities of artworks and the specificities of particular media. John Passmore, “The Dreariness of Aesthetics,” *Mind* 60 (1951): 318–35. See also Marx W. Wartowsky, “The Liveliness of Aesthetics,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 46 (1987): 211–18; and Joseph Margolis, “Exorcising the Dreariness of Aesthetics,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 51 (1993): 133–40.

14. Richard Rorty, “Der Roman als Mittel zur Erlösung aus der Selbstbezogenheit,” in *Dimensionen ästhetischer Erfahrung*, ed. Joachim Küpper and Christoph Menke (Frankfurt, Germany: Suhrkamp, 2003), pp. 49–66; here, p. 54; quote trans. from the German by Julia Jansen.

15. Mary Devereaux, “The Philosophical Status of Aesthetics,” <http://www.aesthetics-online.org/ideas/devereaux.html> (accessed September 13, 2006).

16. See note 5.

17. A quick look at recently published collections alone in analytic aesthetics and aesthetics more generally demonstrates the ongoing rediscovery in philosophy. See Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley, eds., *Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philosophical Debates* (London: Routledge, 2001); Peter Lamarque, ed., *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); Matthew Kieran, ed., *Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); Jerold Levinson,

ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens, eds., *Philosophy and Conceptual Art* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2007).

18. Joseph Kossuth, “Art after Philosophy,” in *Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 164–77. Originally published in *Studio International* 178, nos. 915–17 (1969): 134–37, 160–61, 212–13.

19. Anita Silvers, “Aesthetics of Art’s Sake, Not for Philosophy’s!” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 51 (1993): 141–50; here, 149.

20. Peter Osborne and Andrew Benjamin, *Thinking Art: Beyond Traditional Aesthetics* (London: Institute of Contemporary Art, 1991), p. xi. For a fine example of what can be gained from a sensitive attention to the particularities of artworks, see Peter Osborne, *Conceptual Art* (London: Phaidon, 2002).

21. Mark Wilsher, “Judgement Call,” *Art Monthly* 280 (October 2004): 7–10.

22. Hal Foster, ed., *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture* (New York: New Bay Press, 1998). See also Marcel Duchamp’s use of the term “anaesthetic” in “Marcel Duchamp: Apropos of ‘Readymades.’” Lecture at the Museum of Modern Art, New York, October 19, 1961. Published in: *Art and Artists* 1, no. 4 (July 1966); and Alan Badiou’s recent invocation of “inaesthetics” in *Handbook of Inaesthetics*, trans. Alberto Toscano (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

23. Major retrospectives of the last few years include Donald Judd (London, Düsseldorf, Basel), Robert Smithson (Los Angeles, Dallas, and New York), Dan Flavin (Washington, Fort Worth, Chicago), Bruce Nauman (Tate Modern, London, which was arguably also a retrospective in audio), and Richard Serra’s installation in Bilbao. See also Donna de Salvo, *Open Systems 1970: Rethinking Art C. 1970* (London: Tate, 2005).

24. Lucy Lippard, *Six Years: The Dematerialization of the Art Object from 1966 to 1972* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

25. Arthur C. Danto, *After the End of Art* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

26. Robert Morris, *Continuous Project Altered Daily: The Writings of Robert Morris* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993); Rosalind Krauss, *Passages in Modern Sculpture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977).

27. Nicolas Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics* (Dijon, France: Les Presses du Réel, 2002), p. 14.

28. Lippard, *Six Years*.

29. Excellent examples of such work are Isobel Armstrong, *Radical Aesthetics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); and Jonathan Loesberg, *A Return to Aesthetics* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

30. Kant’s account of the “antinomy of taste” in the *Critique of Judgment* sets a background to this problem; see Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987), especially sections 56 and 57.

31. Barnett Newman, *Selected Writings and Interviews*, ed. J. P. O'Neill (New York: Knopf, 1990), pp. 242–43, 304.

32. Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 8.

33. It is still important to remember Michel Foucault's warning against the danger of overly facile projections of universal agreement. See Michel Foucault, "What Is an Author?" in *Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method, Epistemology (Essential Works by Michel Foucault, vol. 2)*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: New Press, 1998), pp. 205–22.

34. Hal Foster, "Postmodernism: A Preface," in *The Anti-Aesthetic* (Seattle, WA: Bay Press, 1983), p. xv.

35. Paul Mattick, Jr., "Aesthetics and Anti-Aesthetics in the Visual Arts," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 51 (1993): 253–59; here, 258.

36. Clement Greenberg, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," *Partisan Review* 6 (1939): 34–49. Reprinted in John O'Brian, ed., *The Collected Essays and Criticism*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 5–22.

37. See Theodor Adorno, "Commitment," in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, trans. F. McDonagh (Oxford: Continuum, 1978), pp. 300–18.

38. Walter Benjamin, "The Author as Producer," in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (Oxford: Continuum, 1978), pp. 254–69, here p. 255. A standard criticism of these practices is that they run the risk of compromising political agendas by aestheticizing them, whilst equally compromising the aesthetic quality of the work by accommodating external, namely political, subject matter. The worry is, in short, that political agendas become no more than further subjects for artistic practice while artistic agendas become no more than further means for political struggle. As a result, the difference between the political and the aesthetic is flattened and the specific significance of either lost. See "No to Beuys" in *Formless*, ed. Rosalind Krauss and Yves-Alain Bois (New York: Zone Books, 1997), pp. 143–46, in which Beuys is criticized for his "drive toward a totalized system in which everything is recuperated by the "social sculpture."

39. Isobel Armstrong, *Radical Aesthetics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 2.

Chapter 1

1. Herbert Read, *Art Now* (1933; repr., London: Faber, 1968), pp. 26–27. Read played a major role in introducing *Kunstwissenschaft* to England (in contrast to Roger Fry who was very much the connoisseur). He also became the first president of the British Society of Aesthetics and promoted Dessoir's ideas through its constitution. The Society in recent years has identified itself with the academic discipline of philosophical aesthetics and has cut itself off from psychological, sociological, and critical approaches to the aesthetic.

2. Available in English as Max Dessoir, *Aesthetics and the Theory of Art: Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* (1923, 2nd ed.; repr., Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1970).

3. See Robert Fischer, *Über das optische Formgefühl: ein Beitrag zur Ästhetik* (Leipzig: Hermann Credner, 1873); Theodor Lipps, *Ästhetische Faktoren der Raumschauung. Beiträge zur Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane.* (Hamburg: Voss, 1891); and Johannes Volkelt, *Der Symbol-Begriff in der neuesten Ästhetik* (Jena: Hermann Dufft, 1876).
4. See Conrad Fiedler, *Über die Beurteilung von Werken der bildenden Kunst* (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1876); and Adolf Hildebrand, *Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst* (Strassburg: J.H.E. Heitz, 1893.)
5. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Classic Art*, trans. Peter and Linda Murray (London: Phaidon, 1952), p. xi.
6. Heinrich Wölfflin, *The Principles of Art History* (New York: Doer, 1950); original published in German in 1915).
7. This is documented so admirably by Elizabeth Gilmore Holt, *The Expanding World of Art 1874–1902* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988).
8. Alois Riegl, *Late Roman Art Industry*, trans. Rolf Winkes (Rome: Giorgio Bretschneider, 1985), p. 6.
9. Alois Riegl, *Historical Grammar of the Arts*, trans. Jacqueline E. Jung (New York: Zone Books, 2004), p. 287.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 288.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Riegl, *Late Roman Art Industry*, p. 9. Thanks to a recent explosion of interest, Riegl's analysis of the history of art is now well-known. See, for example, Richard Woodfield, ed., *Framing Formalism: Riegl's Work* (New York: Routledge, 2001).
13. Julius von Schlosser, "Die Wiener Schule der Kunstgeschichte. Rückblick auf ein Säkulum deutscher Gelehrtenarbeit in Österreich," *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung* 13, no. 2 (1934): 64.
14. Julius von Schlosser, "'Stilgeschichte,' und 'Sprachgeschichte' der bildenden Kunst: Ein Rückblick," *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Abteilung* 1 (1935): 3.
15. Riegl, *Historical Grammar of the Arts*, pp. 292–93.
16. Schlosser, "Stilgeschichte," p. 8.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
20. He quoted Tolstoy in support: "Geniuses are entirely independent of one another. Spare me the attempts to 'explain' Flaubert from Balzac." *Ibid.*, p. 14.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
26. Now available in translation by Matthew Rampley as "Alois Riegl," in Woodfield, *Framing Formalism*, pp. 33–48; original emphasis.

27. Hans Sedlmayr, “Towards a Rigorous Study of Art,” in *The Vienna School Reader*, ed. Christopher Wood (1931; repr., New York: Zone Books, 2000), p. 135.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 144; original emphasis.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, p. 149; original emphasis.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 169–70.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
35. Ernst Gombrich, “Wandlungen in der Kunstbetrachtung (Von Winckelmann bis zur Jetztzeit),” (1928). This *Hausarbeit* [essay] is cited by courtesy of Sir Ernst.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 77–78. When I spoke to him about his *Hausarbeit*, Gombrich was still proud of the way in which he had conducted his analysis and still stood by his conclusion. Today one might reexamine it in the light of his essay, “The Logic of Vanity Fair,” reprinted in *Ideals and Idols: Essays on Values in History and in Art* (Oxford: Phaidon, 1979).
37. Hans Tietze, *Lebendige Kunstwissenschaft. Zur Krise der Kunst und der Kunstgeschichte* (Vienna: Krystall-Verlag, 1925). Quoted in Gombrich, *Wandlungen*, p. 76.
38. “Art and Scholarship,” originally given as an inaugural lecture in 1957, reprinted in E. H. Gombrich, *Meditations on a Hobby Horse* (London: Phaidon, 1963), p. 112.
39. Karl Bühler, *Ausdruckstheorie: Das System an der Geschichte Aufgezeigt* (Jena, Germany: Fischer, 1933).
40. Karl Bühler, *Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache* (Jena, Germany: Fischer, 1934). Now available in translation as Karl Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, trans. Donald Fraser Goodwin (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 1990).
41. For a good introduction to Bühler’s *Organonmodell der Sprache*, see Klaus Lepsky, “Art and Language: Ernst H. Gombrich and Karl Bühler’s Theory of Language,” in *Gombrich on Art and Psychology*, ed. Richard Woodfield (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. 27–42.
42. E. H. Gombrich, “Raphael’s *Stanza della Segnatura* and the Nature of Its Symbolism,” *Norm and Form* (1972): 95. Gombrich expanded his accounts of “abstractive relevance” and “mental set” in the preface to the 2000 edition of *Art and Illusion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
43. E. H. Gombrich, “Art History and Psychology in Vienna Fifty Years Ago,” *Art Journal* 44, no. 2 (Summer 1984): 163.
44. This became a theme that ran through Gombrich’s publications up to and including his *New York Review of Books* review of John Shearman’s *Only Connect . . . Art and the Spectator in the Renaissance* (1993).
45. E. H. Gombrich, “J. Bodonyi, Entstehung und Bedeutung des Goldgrundes in der spätantiken Bildkomposition,” *Kritische Berichte zur Kunstgeschichtlichen Literatur* 5

(1935): 65–75 [Gombrich's review of Bodonyi's journal article]; and E. H. Gombrich, "Achievement in Medieval Art," in *Meditations on a Hobby Horse* (London: Phaidon, 1963), pp. 70–77 [originally published in 1937 as "Wertprobleme und mittelalterliche Kunst" in *Kritische Berichte*]. See R. Woodfield, "Gombrich, Formalism and the Description of Works of Art," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 34, no. 2 (1994): 134–45.

46. Karl Bühler, *Die Erscheinungsweisen der Farben* [The Appearances of Colours] (Jena, Germany, 1922).

47. E. H. Gombrich, "Style, Skill and Function in Image Making," (unpublished manuscript, The Trilling Seminar, Columbia University, New York, 1987), pp. 9–10. Cited by courtesy of Sir Ernst.

48. Gombrich, "J. Bodonyi, Entstehung und Bedeutung des Goldgrundes in der spätantiken Bildkomposition," p. 72.

49. Gombrich, "Achievement in Medieval Art," pp. 75–76.

50. T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," in *Selected Essays* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950) [originally published in 1919]. .

51. E. H. Gombrich, *The Story of Art*, 15th ed. (Oxford: Phaidon, 1989), p. 3.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

55. The hero of J-K Huysmans, *Against Nature*, trans. Robert Baldick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959).

56. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

57. Bernard Berenson, *The Arch of Constantine* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1954), p. 19.

58. The expression is Gombrich's. See his review, "The Art of the Greeks," in E. H. Gombrich, *Reflections on the History of Art*, ed. Richard Woodfield (Oxford: Phaidon, 1987), p. 12.

59. "Meditations on a Hobby Horse," in Gombrich, *Meditations on a Hobby Horse*, p. 11.

Chapter 2

1. See James Elkins, "Why Don't Art Historians Attend Aesthetics Meetings?" in *Art History versus Aesthetics* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

2. Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar, *Truth and Beauty: Aesthetics and Motivations in Science* (New York: Viking, 1987).

3. Sidney Perkowitz, "Science and Art Are Closer than You Think," <http://webexhibits.org/hockneyoptics/post/perkowitz.html> (accessed March 22, 2008).

4. Felice Frankel, "Sightings," *American Scientist* 10 (September–October 2004): 463. This example is pursued in James Elkins, ed., *Visual Practices Across the University*. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2007).

5. Leo Steinberg, "Art and Science: Should They Be Yoked?" *Daedalus* 115, no. 1 (1986): 1–16; here, p. 5.

6. T. J. Clark, *Farewell to an Idea: Episodes in a History of Modernism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).
7. Wesley Trimpi, *Muses of One Mind: The Literary Analysis of Experience and Its Continuity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), discussed in chapter 1 of James Elkins, *The Poetics of Perspective* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
8. Paul Smith, “Seurat, The Natural Scientist?” *Apollo* 132, no. 346 (December 1990): 381–85, especially 382–83.
9. John Gage, “The *Technique* of Seurat: A Reappraisal,” *The Art Bulletin* 69 no. 3 (1987): 453.
10. William Innes Homer, *Seurat and the Science of Painting* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1964), pp. 131–32.
11. Alan Lee, “Seurat and Science,” *Art History* 10, no. 2 (1987): 223.
12. Robert L. Herbert, *Georges Seurat 1859–1891* (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1991), p. 389.
13. Lee, “Seurat and Science,” p. 221.
14. Hermann von Helmholtz, “The Relation of Optics to Paintings,” in *Selected Writings of Hermann von Helmholtz*, ed. Russell Kahl (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press 1971), p. 317.
15. Martin Kemp, “Science, Non-Science and Nonsense: The Interpretation of Brunelleschi’s Perspective,” *Art History* 1, no. 2 (1978): 134–61.
16. Gage, “The *Technique* of Seurat,” p. 453.
17. Robert L. Herbert, *Neo-Impressionism* (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1968), p. 20.
18. Recorded by Charles Angrand; see John Rewald, *Post-impressionism: from Van Gogh to Gauguin*, 2nd ed. (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1962; distributed by Doubleday, Garden City, NY).
19. Herbert, *Neo-Impressionism*, p. 19.
20. Lee, “Seurat and Science,” p. 223.
21. Benoit Mandelbrot, *The Fractal Geometry of Nature* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982), p. 1.
22. What a contrast between the rococo exuberance of pre- or counter-revolutionary geometry, and the near-total visual bareness of the works of Weierstrass, Cantor, and Peano! In physics, an analogous movement threatened since about 1800, since Laplace’s *Celestial Mechanics* avoided all illustration. And it is exemplified by a statement by P.A.M. Dirac (in the preface to his 1930 *Quantum Mechanics*) that nature’s “fundamental laws do not govern the world as it appears in our mental picture in any direct way, but instead they control a substratum of which we cannot form a mental picture without introducing irrelevancies.”
23. Mandelbrot, *The Fractal Geometry of Nature*, p. 23, citing F. Dyson, “Characterizing Irregularity,” *Science* 200, no. 4342 (1978): 677–78.
24. Mandelbrot, *The Fractal Geometry of Nature*, p. 4.

25. For this distinction, which is not the same as Kant's, see James Elkins, "Clarification, Destruction and Negation of Space in the Age of Neoclassicism," *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte* 56, no. 4 (1990): 560–82.

26. These comments do not apply universally; an example of a visually acute researcher is Clifford A. Pickover (IBM Watson Laboratory, Yorktown Heights, NY). On the other hand, the prevalence of "psychedelic" aesthetics is visible in the slides that accompany each issue of the journal *Amygdala*. Some chaotic dynamics remains nonvisual; see "Is Chaos Becoming Conversational?" *Nature* 341 (1989): 17.

27. Slavoj Žižek, *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), p. 38.

28. The original reference is E. N. Lorenz, "Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow," *Journal of Atmospheric Science* 20 (1963): 130.

29. For another set of parallels, see A. Senior, "Embracing Wayward Nature: The Influence of Early Chinese Painting and Fractal Geometry on the Work of Contemporary Artists," *Leonardo* 20 (1987): 31–34.

30. Ellen Winner, "Art History Can Trade Insights with the Sciences," *Chronicle Review* [*Chronicle of Higher Education*] 50, no. 43 (2004): B10.

31. David Galenson, *Painting Outside the Lines* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

Chapter 3

1. Adrian Stokes, *The Quattrocento and Stones of Rimini*, with a foreword by Stephen Bann and introductions by David Carrier and Stephen Kite (1932; repr., University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).

See my review of this book in *Art Bulletin* LXXXVII, no. 3 (2005), from which a few of these words are taken. Another version of this essay appeared in Stephen Bann, ed., *The Coral Mind: Adrian Stokes's Engagement with Art History, Criticism, Architecture, and Psychoanalysis* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).

2. Stokes, *The Quattrocento and Stones of Rimini*, p. 171.

3. See the recent biography of Stokes, especially chapter 8, by Richard Read, *Art and Its Discontents: The Early Life of Adrian Stokes* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002). Also see Stephen Bann, "The Case for Stokes (and Pater)," *Poetry Nation Review* 6, no. 1 (1978): 6–9; Stephen Bann, "Adrian Stokes 1902–1972: A Supplement," *Poetry Nation Review* 1, no. 15 (1980): 30; and Richard Wollheim, "Adrian Stokes, Critic, Painter, Poet," *Times Literary Supplement* 17 (1978): 207–209.

4. David Carrier, "Introduction to *The Quattrocento*." In the same volume, see Stephen Kite, "Introduction to *The Stones of Rimini*," who declares that "what connects Stokes to modernism, modernism to Italy, and carving to modernism is the allure of the hieratic stillness of some quattrocento art" (p. 12). See also the sculptures of Henry Moore, Barbara Hepworth, and Ben Nicholson, who emphasize "the *thingness* of the thing" (p. 18).

5. Susan Stewart, *On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), *passim*.

6. Richard Stamelman, *Lost Beyond Telling: Representations of Death and Absence in Modern French Poetry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 7.

7. Michael Ann Holly, “Mourning and Method,” *Art Bulletin* LXXXIV, no. 4 (2002): 660–69.

8. Frederick Hartt, *History of Italian Renaissance Art: Painting, Sculpture, Architecture*, 2d ed. (New York: H. N. Abrams, 1979), p. 232. Sam Edgerton told me that Sigismondo was the only man to be “canonized a saint in Hell.” A delightful fiction about this episode can be found in Frances Fleetwood, *L’elefante e la rosa. Storia della famiglia Malatesta* [The Elephant and the Rose: Romance of the Malatesta, Family of Rimini] (Imola: Grafiche Galeati, 1970).

9. See Charles Mitchell, “Il Tempio Malatestiano,” *Studi Malatestiani: Studi Storici-Fasc.* 110–111 (1978): 71–103.

10. Stokes, *The Quattrocento and Stones of Rimini*, p. 15.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 132–33.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

23. Aby Warburg, *The Renewal of Pagan Antiquity: Contributions to the Cultural History of the European Renaissance*, intro Kurt Forster, trans. David Britt (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1999).

24. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. from French by Sian Reynolds, 1st U.S. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 16.

25. Stokes, *The Quattrocento and Stones of Rimini*, p. 92.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

28. Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of a Work of Art,” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 42–43.

29. John Keats, “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” in *Selected Poems*, ed. John Barnard (London: Penguin, 1999). “O Attic shape! Fair attitude! with brede / Of marble men and maidens overwrought, / With forest branches and the trodden weed / Thou, silent form, dost tease us out of thought / As doth eternity” (p. 169).

30. Richard Wollheim, preface to *The Invitation in Art*, by Adrian Stokes (New York: Tavistock Press, 1965), p. xxi.
31. Christopher Bollas, *The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 16.
32. Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works*, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1957), vol. 14, pp. 237–58.
33. Melanie Klein, *The Psycho-Analysis of Children*, trans. Alix Strachey, rev. Alix Strachey and H. A. Thorner (1933; repr., London: Hogarth, 1989); the last section on Stokes is “Case Material—Mr. B.” See Read, *Art and Its Discontents*, p. 195; Read mentions that there were some attempts to conceal Stokes’s identity.
34. Stokes, *The Quattrocento and Stones of Rimini*, pp. 164–65.
35. Maurice Blanchot, *The Station Hill Blanchot Reader: Fiction and Literary Essays*, trans. L. Davis, P. Auster, and R. Lamberton (Barrytown, NY: Station Hill/Barrytown, Ltd., 1998), p. 345.
36. Bollas, *The Shadow of the Object*, p. 40. See D. W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality* (London: Routledge, 1974). See also Michael Podro, *Depiction* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 148–49.
37. Stokes, *The Quattrocento and Stones of Rimini*, p. 24.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
39. Adrian Stokes, *The Invitation in Art* (New York: Tavistock Press, 1965), pp. 30, 63; emphasis added.
40. Stamelman, *Lost Beyond Telling*, p. 20.
41. See Stephen Bann’s evocation of Barthes’s “practice of the text.” Stephen Bann, “The Case for Stokes (and Pater),” *Poetry Nation Review* 96, no. 1 (1978); Charles Merewether, “A Lasting Impression,” *Trace* (Liverpool, UK: England Biennial catalogue, 1999), p. 168.
42. *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary*, 3 volumes (Chicago: Merriman, 1976).
43. Heidegger, “The Origin of a Work of Art,” p. 40.
44. Michael Baxandall, *Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 3–4. See Michael Ann Holly, “Patterns in the Shadows: Attention in/to the Writings of Michael Baxandall,” *Art History* 21 (December 1998): 46–78.
45. Stokes, *The Quattrocento and Stones of Rimini*, p. 141.
46. Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).
47. Stokes, *The Quattrocento and Stones of Rimini*, p. 222.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 223.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

52. See Erwin Panofsky's essay, "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," in *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 1–25.
53. John Nobel Wilford, "New Views of a Century of Stars," *International Herald Tribune*, January 18, 2001, p. 10.
54. Stokes, *The Quattrocento and Stones of Rimini*, p. 44.
55. Henri Focillon, *The Life of Forms in Art*, trans. George Kubler (New York: Zone Books, 1992), p. 32.
56. William J. Broad, "In a Lab on Long Island: A Visit to the Big Bang," *New York Times*, January 14, 2003, p. D1.
57. *Ibid.*, p. D4.
58. Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (1944; repr., New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 185.
59. Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), p. 59.
60. Julia Kristeva, *Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 103.
61. George Kubler, *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 19.
62. Kristeva, *Black Sun*, pp. 8–9.

Chapter 4

I would like to thank audiences at the University College Cork, School of the Art Institute of Chicago, University of Victoria, Society for Literature, Science, and Art, and College Art Association for permitting me to work through these ideas with them. Particular thanks go to Allan Antliff, James Elkins, Anne Goodyear, Adrian Kohn, Mette Gieskes, and the students in my "Krauss" and "Fried" seminars of the last few years.

This work is dedicated to Jodi, Levi, and Dox.

1. Michael Fried, "Three American Painters: Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Frank Stella" (1965), in *Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews*, ed. Michael Fried (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 219.
2. Rosalind E. Krauss, *The Optical Unconscious* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 12–13; see also pp. 23–27.
3. T. J. Clark, "Arguments About Modernism: A Reply to Michael Fried," in *Pollock and After: The Critical Debate*, ed. Francis Frascina (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 103.
4. Compare with William James, "The Will to Believe," in *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Psychology* (New York: Dover, [1897] 1956), p. 10.
5. Rosalind E. Krauss, *Passages in Modern Sculpture* (1977; repr., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), pp. 245 and 266; Krauss, "The Mind/Body Problem: Robert Morris in Series," in *Robert Morris: The Mind/Body Problem* (New York: Guggenheim Museum, 1994), p. 11; and T. J. Clark, *Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 12.
6. Alexander Alberro, "Beauty Knows No Pain," *Art Journal* 63, no. 2 (2004): 43.

7. James Meyer and Toni Ross, “Aesthetic/Anti-Aesthetic: An Introduction,” *Art Journal* 63, no. 2 (2004): 22.
8. Margaret Iverson, “Readymade, Found Object, Photograph,” *Art Journal* 63, no. 2 (2004): 57. Two sentences are here combined as one, with the order in which they occur reversed.
9. Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson, “Semiotics and Art History,” *Art Bulletin* 73, no. 2 (1991): 174.
10. Hilary Putnam, “Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind,” *Journal of Philosophy* 91, no. 9 (1994): 488–90.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 448. Edwin B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, William Pepperrell Montague, Ralph Baroton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin, and Edward Gleason Spaulding, “Program and First Platform of Six Realists” (1910), in *The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy*, ed. Edwin B. Holt, et. al. (New York: MacMillan, 1925), pp. 47–48. Many years after the 1910 manifesto, Ralph Barton Perry, one of volume’s coauthors, asked, “What-ever became of our program of reform?” Herbert W. Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 512, as cited in Hilary Putnam, *The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World*, The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy, no. 5 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 181, n. 25. More than two decades ago, Charles Harrison and Fred Orton also called for realism in engaging art. Charles Harrison and Fred Orton, “Introduction: Modernism, Explanation and Knowledge,” in *Modernism, Criticism, Realism: Alternative Contexts for Art*, ed. Charles Harrison and Fred Orton (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. xxv.
12. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, quoted in Alex Potts, *The Sculptural Imagination: Figurative, Modernist, Minimalist* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 221; emphasis removed.
13. Clement Greenberg, “Complaints of an Art Critic” (1967), in *Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and Criticism*, vol. 4, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 269.
14. Michael Fried, “Art and Objecthood” (1967), in *Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews*, ed. Michael Fried (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 165; original emphasis; Rosalind Krauss, “A View of Modernism,” *Artforum* 11, no. 1 (1972): 51; and T. J. Clark, “Clement Greenberg’s Theory of Art” (1982), in *Pollock and After: The Critical Debate*, ed. Francis Francina (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 81; original emphasis.
15. Arthur C. Danto, *What Philosophy Is: A Guide to the Elements* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. xi.
16. Clark, “Arguments About Modernism,” p. 109.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 106; original emphasis.
18. Putnam, “Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses,” 1994, pp. 453 and 488. Compare with Harrison and Orton, “Introduction,” p. xix.
19. Michael Fried, “How Modernism Works: A Response to T. J. Clark” in *Pollock and After: The Critical Debate*, ed. Francis Francina (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 92.

20. Margaret Olin, *Forms of Representation in Alois Riegl's Theory of Art* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), p. 137.
21. *Jackson Pollock: Tim Clark and Michael Fried in Conversation*, video recording, produced by G. D. Jayalakshmi and Nick Levinson (East Sussex, England: Open University; Ho-Ho-Kus, NJ: Roland Films on Art, 1993).
22. Krauss, *Passages in Modern Sculpture*, p. 287. Harrison and Orton, "Introduction," p. xxi; emphasis removed.
23. Michael Fried, "An Introduction to My Art Criticism," in *Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews*, ed. Michael Fried (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 22; and Fried, "Three American Painters," pp. 224–25.
24. Krauss, *The Optical Unconscious*, p. 293.
25. Clark, *Farewell*, pp. 309–10.
26. Danto, *What Philosophy Is*, p. 148.
27. John R. Searle, *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World* (New York: Basic Books, 1998), p. 17.
28. Terry Eagleton, *After Theory* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), p. 109.
29. Clark, "Arguments About Modernism," p. 109.
30. For more on this point, see David Raskin, "The Shiny Illusionism of Krauss and Judd," *Art Journal* 65, no. 1 (2006): 19–21.
31. Rosalind Krauss, "A View of Modernism," *Artforum* 11, no. 1 (1972): 51.
32. Michael Fried, *Manet's Modernism, or, The Face of Painting in the 1860s* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 406.
33. Fried, "An Introduction to My Art Criticism," p. 56, n. 11. In 1965, Fried wrote: "A man is judged neither by his intention nor by his act," Merleau-Ponty has written [Merleau-Ponty's "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence"], 'but by whether or not he has been able to infuse his deed with values.'" Fried, "Three American Painters," pp. 256 and 263, n. 12. The 1964 English translation, which Fried used in 1998, is Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, trans. and intro. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 72.
34. Karl R. Popper, "What Is Dialectic?" *Mind* 49, no. 196 (1940): 403–26.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 410; emphasis removed.
36. Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (1957; repr., London: Routledge, 2002).
37. Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses," p. 516.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 446 and 517.
39. William James, "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, ed. William James, intro. Ellen Kappy Suckiel, pref. Ralph Barton Perry (1912; repr., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), p. 37.
40. Eagleton, *After Theory*, p. 155.
41. Compare with Mark Bauerlein, *The Pragmatic Mind: Explorations in the Psychology of Belief* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 106–7.
42. Dan Flavin, "Some Remarks . . . Excerpts from a Spleenish Journal," *Artforum* 5, no. 4 (1966), p. 27.

Chapter 5

1. Richard Wollheim, “Response to James I. Porter,” in *Erotikon: Essays on Eros, Ancient and Modern*, ed. Shadi Bartsch and Thomas Bartscherer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 142.

2. Bridget Riley, “In Conversation with Maurice de Sausmarez” (1967), in *The Eye’s Mind: Bridget Riley, Collected Writings 1965–1999*, ed. Robert Kudielka (London: Thames and Hudson, 1999), pp. 58 and 61.

3. Bridget Riley, “According to Sensation: In Conversation with Robert Kudielka” (1990), in *The Eye’s Mind: Bridget Riley*, p. 120.

4. Piet Mondrian, quoted in Carl Holty, “Mondrian in New York: A Memoir,” *Arts* 31 (1957): 21.

5. Traditional Western art tends to feature modes of production that involve the direct participation of an individual artist-producer. By convention, marks of the hand and similarly idiosyncratic features indicate this personalized process. Accordingly, many viewers hesitate to accept as art any products that lack such signs of personality: photographs, industrially fabricated sculptures like those of Donald Judd, and also paintings like those of Bridget Riley.

6. Riley, “According to Sensation,” p. 84.

7. Bridget Riley, “Perception Is the Medium” (1965), in *The Eye’s*, pp. 66 and 68.

8. Riley, “According to Sensation,” p. 84 (original emphasis). Riley’s distinction between the natural wildness of visual sensations and their subjection to a mediated order, either representational or conceptual, has a parallel in Peirce’s categories of consciousness. Peircean “Firstness” corresponds to perceptual wildness: “First, feeling, the [mode of] consciousness which can be included with an instant, passive consciousness of quality, without recognition [a factor of representation] or analysis [a factor of conceptualization].” From Charles Sanders Peirce, “A Guess at the Riddle” [c. 1890], in *Collected Papers*, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958–1960), vol. 1, p. 200.

9. Donald Judd, “Barnett Newman” (1964–1970), in *Complete Writings 1959–1975* (Halifax, Canada: Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, 1975), p. 202. Compare Judd’s sense that modern painting had developed a problem in “credibility” (his word), having become overly generalized and formulaic, so that artists were working in ways that had little to do with their immediate experience and personal understanding: “The only work you [can] really believe in completely would be your own. After that it shades off in various ways depending upon the time and the period and the people involved so that you believe certain elements in someone else’s works and you disbelieve certain elements.” From Donald Judd, statement in Barbara Rose, ed., “Is Easel Painting Dead?” symposium, New York University, November 1966 (transcript, Washington, DC: Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution), pp. 31–32.

10. Riley, “Perception Is the Medium,” pp. 66 and 68.

11. Charles Sanders Peirce, “Telepathy and Perception” (1903), in *Collected Papers*, vol. 7, pp. 369–70.

12. Bridget Riley, interview with author, February 5, 2003.
13. Riley, "According to Sensation," pp. 115–16; original emphasis.
14. Mondrian, quoted in Holty, "Mondrian in New York," p. 21.
15. Riley, "In Conversation with Maurice de Sausmarez," pp. 58 and 61.
16. Richard Serra, "Richard Serra, interviewed by Lynne Cooke, 21 May 1992," in *Richard Serra Drawings* (London: Serpentine Gallery, 1992), p. 13.
17. Serra would coordinate his mark-making with the physicality of his materials: "I no longer wanted to make markings on a piece of paper: I wanted to make the drawing integral to its structure and properties." From Richard Serra, "About Drawing: An Interview" [1977 interview by Lizzie Borden] in *Richard Serra: Writings Interviews* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 58.
18. Richard Serra, *Richard Serra Deadweights* (New York: Pace Gallery, 1992), n.p.
19. Serra's own language hovers on the edge of weight as metaphor and weight as felt sensation: "In Cézanne . . . the objects have weight because of the character of their geometries." From Serra, "About Drawing," p. 55.
20. The latter group of properties can be investigated in the absence of external objects, through the movements of the human body: Hence Serra's longstanding interest in dance.
21. Richard Serra, "Richard Serra: An Interview by Mark Rosenthal," in *Richard Serra: Drawings and Etchings from Iceland* (New York: Matthew Marks Gallery, 1992), n.p.
22. Richard Serra, "Notes on Drawing" (1987), in *Serra: Writings Interviews*, pp. 178–79.
23. Serra, "About Drawing," p. 51.
24. Compare the related but simpler case of "two black shapes installed on opposite walls [that] foreshorten the width of the room. The enclosure becomes narrower; the compression of the space is haptically registered." From Serra, "Notes on Drawing," p. 178.
25. See Peirce, "Telepathy and Perception," pp. 369–70.
26. Serra, "About Drawing," pp. 51–52; original emphasis.
27. Richard Serra, during interview by Nicholas Serota and David Sylvester, May 27, 1992, from Nicholas Serota, ed., *Richard Serra: Weight and Measure 1992* (London: Tate Gallery, 1992), p. 25. Clement Greenberg responded to Newman similarly: "One reacts to an environment as much as to a picture hung on a wall." From Clement Greenberg, "'American-Type' Painting" [rev. 1958] in *Art and Culture* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p. 226.
28. Richard Serra, statement (1992) in Barbaralee Diamonstein, *Inside the Artworld* (New York: Rizzoli, 1994), p. 226.
29. Donald Judd, "Some Aspects of Color in General and Red and Black in Particular" (1993) in *Donald Judd*, ed. Nicholas Serota (London: Tate, 2004), p. 147.
30. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind" (1961), in *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. James M. Edie, trans. Carleton Dallery (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 161.

31. Donald Judd, “Jackson Pollock” (1967), in *Complete Writings 1959–1975*, p. 195.
32. In Peircean terms, the feeling is “Firstness,” the fact that you feel it is “Secondness,” what it is, what you know it *as*, is “Thirdness.”
33. Judd, “Some Aspects of Color,” pp. 158–59.
34. Donald Judd, “21 February 93,” in *Donald Judd: Large-scale Works* (New York: Pace Gallery, 1993), p. 9.
35. William James, “Does Consciousness Exist?” *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 1 (1 September 1904), p. 491. (I thank David Raskin for alerting me to this text.) For related statements from Peirce, see his letters to William James, September 28, 1904, and October 3, 1904, in *Collected Papers*, vol. 8, pp. 198–206; and “A Guess at the Riddle,” vol. 1, pp. 200–201. On breath and the physicality of visual sensation, see Richard Shiff, “Breath of Modernism (Metonymic Drift),” in *In Visible Touch: Modernism and Masculinity*, ed. Terry Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 184–213.
36. Donald Judd, “Art and Architecture” (1983), in *Complete Writings 1975–1986*, p. 30; Donald Judd, statement in Angeli Janhsen, ed., “Discussion with Donald Judd,” in *Donald Judd* (St. Gall, Switzerland: Kunstverein St. Gallen, 1990), p. 54.
37. Bridget Riley, interview with author, July 25, 2005.
38. Bridget Riley, “The Artist’s Eye: Seurat” (1992), in *The Eye’s Mind*, p. 180.
39. Riley interview, July 25, 2005.
40. Bridget Riley, interview with author, September 14, 2005.
41. See Richard Shiff, “Whiteout: The Not-Influence Newman Effect,” in *Barnett Newman*, ed. Ann Temkin (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 2002), pp. 77–111.
42. Barnett Newman, interview with David Sylvester [1965], in David Sylvester, “Concerning Barnett Newman,” *The Listener* 88 (August 10, 1972): 169–70.
43. Riley, “In Conversation with Maurice de Saumarez,” pp. 58 and 61.
44. As reported by sculptor Herbert Ferber to Kirk Varnedoe in November 1983; see Kirk Varnedoe, “Abstract Expressionism,” in *Primitivism in 20th Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern*, 2 vols., ed. William Rubin (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1984), vol. 2, p. 635.
45. Barnett Newman, statement in “A Conversation: Barnett Newman and Thomas B. Hess” [1966] in *Barnett Newman: Selected Writings and Interviews*, ed. John P. O’Neill (New York: Knopf, 1990), p. 282.
46. On the historical origins for an aesthetics of anonymity and self-awareness, as a practice of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (into the 1940s, Newman’s era), see Richard Shiff, “Tangible Datum,” in *Estudios de Historia del Arte en Honor de Tomàs Llorens*, ed. Valeriano Bozal (Madrid: Machado, 2007), pp. 509–27.

Chapter 6

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987), p. 61.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

— I
— O
— +I

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 63.
5. Donald Judd, “Specific Objects,” *Arts Yearbook VIII* (1965). Reprinted in Donald Judd, *Complete Writings 1959–1975* (Halifax, Canada: The Press of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, 1975), p. 184.
6. Clement Greenberg, “Seminar One,” *Arts Magazine* 48 (1973). Reprinted in Clement Greenberg, *Homemade Esthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 8.
7. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 63.
8. Robert Morris, “Notes on Sculpture, Part I,” *Artforum*, February 1966; repr. in Gregory Battcock, ed. *Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology* (New York: Dutton, 1968), p. 226.
9. Rosalind Krauss, “Death of a Hermeneutic Phantom: Materialization of the Sign in the Work of Peter Eisenman, *a + u*” (1980). Reprinted in Peter Eisenmann, *House of Cards* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 166–88.
10. Rosalind Krauss, *Passages in Modern Sculpture* (New York: Viking Press, 1977).
11. Marcia Tucker, *Robert Morris* (New York: Whitney Museum of American Art, 1970), p. 25.
12. I am alluding to the last sentence of Michael Fried’s notorious essay, “Art and Objecthood” (1967), where he opposes the mere *presence* of minimal art to the feeling of *presentness* he gets from truly modernist art: “Presentness is grace.” Michael Fried, *Artforum* (June 1967). Reprinted in Michael Fried, *Art and Objecthood* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 168.

Chapter 7

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), p. 4:003.
2. John Dewey, “The Need for Recovery in Philosophy,” [1917] in *The Collected Works of John Dewey*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1969–1991), vol 10, p. 42.
3. There is no English term. It refers to a mode of organizing knowledge in a given period.
4. All quotations here from Marcel Duchamp. “A propos of ‘Readymades.’” A talk delivered at the Museum of Modern Art, New York, October, 19, 1961. Reprinted in Marcel Sanouillet and Elmer Peterson, eds. *Salt Seller: The Writings of Marcel Duchamp (Marchand du Sel)* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 141–42.
5. Pierre Cabanne, *Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp*, trans. Run Padgett (New York: Da Capo Press, 1987), p. 43.
6. Ibid.
7. George Dickie, *Aesthetics: An Introduction* (Waltham, MA: Pegasus Books, 1971), p. 101.
8. Arthur C. Danto, *The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art* (Chicago: Open Court, 2003).

9. Translated as Hans Belting, *Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image before the Era of Art*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
10. Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931–58), vol. 8, p. 255.
11. Charles S. Peirce, *Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, ed. Patrician Ann Turrissi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p. 213.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 173.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Immanuel Kant, “Conclusion,” in *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, 5th ed. (London: Longmans, 1898).
16. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 178.
17. “Let us go, children of the fatherland.” Opening line of the *Marseillaise*, the French National anthem.

Chapter 8

1. See Rosalind Krauss’s relation to Greenberg in Rosalind Krauss, *The Optical Unconscious* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993); and Rosalind Krauss and Yve Alain Bois, *Formless: A User’s Guide* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). On this, see Diarmuid Costello, “Greenberg’s Kant and the Fate of Aesthetics in Contemporary Art Theory,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 65, no. 2, (2007): 217–28.
2. Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” *Collected Essays and Criticism*, Vol. IV, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), pp. 85–86.
3. Clement Greenberg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon,” *Collected Essays and Criticism*, Vol. I, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986).
4. “Agreeable is what the senses like in sensation,” A liking for the beautiful must depend on the reflection, regarding an object . . . This dependence on reflection also distinguishes the liking for the beautiful from [that for] the agreeable, which rests entirely on sensation.” From Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987), §3, Ak. 26, p. 47, and §4, Ak. 207, p. 49.
5. “Pleasure in aesthetic judgment . . . is merely contemplative . . . The very consciousness of a merely formal purposiveness in the play of the subject’s cognitive powers, accompanying a presentation . . . is that pleasure.” *Ibid.*, §12, Ak. 222, p. 68.
6. For Kant, space is the form of all outer sensibility, hence a condition of perceiving anything at all in the external world, while time, as the form of inner sensibility is a condition of perceiving anything whatsoever. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, 1929), Ak. A34/B50, p. 77.
7. Kant, *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, §16, Ak. 229, p. 76.
8. See Clement Greenberg, “Can Taste Be Objective?” *Art News* 72, no. 2 (1973): 23. Reprinted in Clement Greenberg, *Homemade Esthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1999). For a critique, see Thierry de Duve, “Wavering Reflections,” in Thierry de Duve, *Clement Greenberg Between the Lines* (Paris: Dis Voir, 1996), pp. 107–10.

9. Greenberg’s conflation of Kantian “disinterestedness” with “aesthetic distance” is often explicit. See Clement Greenberg, “Observations on Esthetic Distance,” in Clement Greenberg, *Homemade Esthetics*, p. 74. Greenberg attributes his own psychologistic conception of aesthetic distance to Edward Bullough’s account in Clement Greenberg, “Psychical Distance” (1912). Reprinted in Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley, eds., *The Philosophy of Art: Readings Ancient and Modern* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1995), pp. 297–311.

10. Greenberg acknowledges this in Clement Greenberg, “Seminar One,” *Arts Magazine* 42, no. 2 (1973): 44. Reprinted as “Intuition and the Esthetic Experience,” in Clement Greenberg, *Homemade Esthetics*, pp. 3–9.

11. Kant, *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, §9, Ak. 217–19, pp. 61–64.

12. See Thierry de Duve, *Kant after Duchamp* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1996), chap. 5.

13. “The presentation is referred only to the subject, namely, to his feeling of life, under the name feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and this forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and judging. This power does not contribute anything to cognition, but merely compares the given presentation in the subject with the entire presentational power, of which the mind becomes conscious when it feels its own state.” From Kant, *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, §1, Ak. 204, p. 44; my emphasis.

14. Of Kant’s claims, “All [this deduction] asserts is that we are justified in presupposing universally in all people the same subjective conditions of the power of judgment that we find in ourselves,” de Duve remarks, “I read this passage as the best indication that it is the claim to universality that signals disinterestedness, the free play of the faculties, or purposiveness without purpose, and not vice-versa. This finds confirmation in experience . . . in the fact that we feel strongly about the so-called objectivity—the claim to shareability—of our aesthetic judgments.” See Thierry de Duve, “Do Artists Speak on Behalf of All of Us?” in *The Life and Death of Images: Ethics and Aesthetics*, ed. Diarmuid Costello and Dominic Willsdon (London: Tate Publishing, 2008), p. 143.

15. In several recent texts Danto reassesses his relation to Kant. See Arthur C. Danto, *The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art* (Chicago: Open Court, 2003); and Arthur C. Danto, “Embodied Meanings, Isotypes, and Aesthetical Ideas,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 65, no. 1 (2007): 121–29. Greenberg derived two tenets from his reading of Kant. See Arthur C. Danto, *After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 86ff.

16. See Kant, *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, §15, Ak. 228, pp. 74–75.

17. “Where the organs are so fine, as to allow nothing to escape them; and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition: This we call delicacy of taste.” From David Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” in *The Philosophy of Art*, ed. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), p. 260.

18. Kant, *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, §45, Ak. 307, p. 174.

19. Ibid., §45, Ak. 306, p. 173; my emphasis.
20. Ibid., §45, Ak. 307, p. 174.
21. See Diarmuid Costello, “On Late Style: Arthur Danto’s *The Abuse of Beauty*,” *British Journal of Aesthetics* 44, no. 4 (2004): 424–39; and Diarmuid Costello, “Whatever Happened to ‘Embodiment’?: The Eclipse of Materiality in Danto’s Ontology of Art,” *Angelaki* 12, no. 2 (2007): 83–94.
22. Arthur C. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Arthur C. Danto, *The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art* (Chicago: Open Court, 2003).
23. See Arthur C. Danto, “Embodied Meanings, Isotypes and Aesthetical Ideas,” p. 125.
24. Kant, *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, §49, Ak. 314, pp. 182–83.
25. Ibid., §49, Ak. 315, p. 183.
26. Ibid., §49, Ak. 315, pp. 183–84.
27. On the index itself these relations were symbolized, respectively, by “+” “—” and “T.” The latter stood for “transformation,” indicating that these documents did not occupy the same logical or ethical space and hence were incomparable. See Charles Harrison, “The Index as Art-work,” in Charles Harrison, *Essays on Art & Language* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 65.
28. Kant, *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, §1, Ak. 204, p. 44.
29. Ibid., §49, Ak. 315, pp. 183–84.

Chapter 9

This chapter is based on a paper titled “The Work of Art in the Age of Curatorial Production,” which was originally presented as part of a series in the University of Southampton’s Golden Jubilee celebrations in 2001. A revised version of the paper was presented at a colloquium on logical progressions in art hosted by the Museum of Modern Art in Antwerp, Belgium, in January, 2004.

1. See Paul Crowther, *The Language of Twentieth-Century Art. A Conceptual History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).
2. For a detailed discussion of the concept of symbolic arrest see Paul Crowther, *Philosophy After Postmodernism; Civilized Values and the Scope of Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 2003).
3. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987), p. 182.
4. Ibid., p. 183.
5. See Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 111.
6. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” in *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 166.
7. For a sustained discussion of contextual space see chapter 6 of Paul Crowther, *The Transhistorical Image: Philosophizing Art and its History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

—-I
—O
—+I

8. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 172.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 175.
10. For more on these issues see chapter 4 of Crowther, *The Transhistorical Image*.
11. Crowther, *The Transhistorical Image*.
12. See Crowther, *The Language of Twentieth-Century Art*.

Chapter 10

1. W. G. Sebald, *After Nature* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2002), p. 36; emphasis added.
2. The title of Jürgen Habermas's original critique of *Truth and Method* was "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," which appears in Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, *The Hermeneutics Reader* (London: Blackwell, 1988), pp. 294–319.
3. See Sarah Churchill's review of David Guterson's approach to the transcendent in *The Times Literary Supplement*, November 21, 2003, no. 5251.
4. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1989), pp. 110–21. Without wishing to suggest that Gadamer's argument is derivative or borrowed, it is noteworthy that Dilthey uses a conception of *transformation* in a similar context in his essay, "The Imagination of the Poet: Elements for a Poetics" (1887). See Wilhelm Dilthey, *Selected Works*, vol. V, *Poetry and Experience*, ed. R. A. Makkreel and F. Rodi (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 93. Whereas Dilthey speaks of poetry as a means to the *transformation* of "lived experience" (*Erlebnissen*), Gadamer, consistent in his critique of the latter concept, speaks of art as the transformation of the real.
 5. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 112.
 6. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 140.
 7. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 143.
 8. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 147.
 9. *Ibid.*
 10. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 112–13.
 11. *Ibid.*
 12. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 62; emphasis added.
 13. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 63.
 14. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 114.
 15. See Nicholas Davey, "Of Beauty and Nearness: A Hermeneutic Reflection," *Annales D'Esthétique*, 36 (1996): 115–37. (This journal is published by the Panayotis and Effie Michelis Foundation in Athens, Greece.)
 16. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 99–100.
 17. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Heidegger's Ways* (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1994), p. 105.
 18. Gadamer, *Heidegger's Ways*, p. 107.
 19. *Ibid.*
 20. *Ibid.*

21. Ibid.
22. “The sayable at the same time brings the unsayable into the world” (“Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” [“On the Origin of the Art Work”]), pp. 59–60). See Cristina Lafont, *The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), p. 63.
23. Gianni Vattimo, *The Transparent Society* (London: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 45–61.
24. Ibid., p. 50.
25. Ibid., p. 51.
26. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 128.
27. Wolfgang Iser, *The Range of Interpretation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 52.
28. Theodor Adorno, *Hegel Three Studies* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. 100.
29. Ibid., p. 77.
30. Gadamer, *Heidegger’s Ways*, p. 107.
31. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 474.
32. Joel Weinsheimer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 123.
33. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 474.
34. Martin Heidegger, “Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung,” in *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (Frankfurt, Germany: V. Klostermann, 1944), pp. 33–48;
35. William Blake, “The Sick Rose,” in *Songs of Innocence and Experience*, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 147.
36. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 140.
37. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 143.
38. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 147.
39. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Introduction,” in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, ed. Martin Heidegger (Stuttgart, Germany: Reclam, 1995), p. 108.
40. Ibid., p. 107.
41. Gadamer, *Heidegger’s Ways*, p. 107.
42. Gadamer, *Heidegger’s Ways*, p. 108.
43. Gadamer, *Heidegger’s Way*, p. 107.
44. Ibid.
45. Gadamer, *Heidegger’s Way*, p. 108.
46. Gadamer, “Introduction,” p. 108.
47. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 140.
48. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 143.

Chapter 11

1. “Foreclosure” (the French *forclusion* renders the German *Verwerfung*, which is usually translated into English as “repudiation”) is the term used by Lacan to denote “a primordial expulsion of a fundamental signifier from the subject’s symbolic universe.” Foreclosed signifiers “are not integrated into the subject’s unconscious. . . . They do not

—I
—O
—+I

return ‘from the inside’—they re-emerge, rather, in ‘the Real,’ particularly through the phenomenon of hallucination.” Hence, in this context, we may say: Aesthetics forecloses, and is therefore compelled to hallucinate, “art.” From J. Laplanche and J–B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (1973; repr., London: Karnac Books and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1988), p. 166.

2. J. M. Bernstein, “Modernism as Aesthetics and Art History,” in *Art History Versus Aesthetics*, ed. James Elkins (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 241, 265.

3. Cf. Bernstein, “Modernism as Aesthetics and Art History,” p. 266: “the premise that modernism is over is false.” The difference between us concerns what, precisely, is meant by “modernism” here; *which* modernism it is that endures. There are many (Arthur Danto, for example) who do not believe that art remains a historically critical practice. For some of them, aesthetics is (re)legitimated on this precise basis, that is, contra modernism. While Bernstein defends modernism as aesthetics (and vice versa) and Danto defends aesthetics after modernism, I defend the metacritical status of modernism *against* its reduction to aesthetics.

4. Peter Osborne, “Modernity: A Different Time,” in *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde* (London: Verso, 1995), chap. 1.

5. Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (1976; repr., London: Fontana, 1988), pp. 173–74, 208–9.

6. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field* (1992), trans. Susan Emanuel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), part I, chaps. 2 and 3, and part III, chap. 3. I abstract here from the fundamental, fascinating, and under-researched issue of the transference of the general concept of “art” from the literary to the visual field, in the course of the nineteenth century.

7. Charles Baudelaire, “The Painter of Modern Life” (1863), in *The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays*, trans. Jonathan Mayne (London: Phaidon, 1964), p. 13.

8. See Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

9. See Peter Osborne, “Modernism as Translation,” in *Philosophy in Cultural Theory* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 58.

10. Baudelaire, “The Painter of Modern Life,” p. 13; Peter Osborne, “Art Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Criticism, Art History and Contemporary Art,” *Art History* 27, no. 4 (2004): 651–70.

11. See Walter Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Verso, 1983).

12. The concept of an autonomously aesthetic art was prefigured by romanticism, against which academic art was to some extent a reaction, just as romanticism also prefigured the modernist concept of the new. However, neither autonomously aesthetic art nor modernism were actualized in romanticism, where (subsequent to 1800 and the end of Jena romanticism) affirmations of autonomy increasingly took the form of the exaltation of the artist’s persona and the absolutization of the artist’s point of view. Cf. the section “The Academic Gaze,” in Pierre Bourdieu, “Manet and the Institutionalization of Ano-

mie,” in *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature*, ed. Randal Johnson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), pp. 239–50.

13. “‘Art for art’s sake’ was scarcely ever to be taken literally; it was almost always a flag under which sailed a cargo that could not be declared because it still lacked a name.” From Walter Benjamin, “Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia” (1929), in *Selected Writings, Volume 2: 1927–1934* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 211–12.

14. Clement Greenberg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon” (1940), in *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 1: Perceptions and Judgements, 1939–1944*, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986), pp. 23–37; Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting” (1960), in *The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4: Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957–1969*, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), pp. 85–93.

15. Thierry de Duve, *Pictorial Nominalism: On Marcel Duchamp’s Passage from Painting to the Readymade* (1984), trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991); Thierry de Duve, *Kant After Duchamp* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

16. For criticism of de Duve’s peculiar use of Saul Kripke’s philosophy of names, for example, see Jason Gaiger, “Art after Beauty: Retrieving Aesthetic Judgement,” *Art History* 20, no. 4 (1997): 611–16.

17. Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* (1970), trans. Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1997).

Chapter 12

1. In his *Aesthetica* (part I: 1750; part II: 1758), Baumgarten used examples from the arts, especially poetry, only to illustrate what aesthetic perfection, or the perfection of sensuous knowledge, could be (Repr., New York: Verlag, 1979).

2. Interest and support for alternative understandings of aesthetics are easier to find outside the discipline: with theoreticians in other fields and cultural institutions and artists whose work is at odds with established philosophical concepts of aesthetics. See Wolfgang Iser, ed., *Die Aktualität des Ästhetischen* (Munich: Fink, 1993).

3. Ludwig Wittgenstein makes this point about language. See *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 48^c [115].

4. *Ibid.*, p. 103^c [309]. This was Wittgenstein’s declared “aim of philosophy.”

5. Letter to August Wilhelm Schlegel, September 3, 1802 in *Aus Schellings Leben. In Briefen*, vol. 1, ed. G. L. Plitt (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1869), pp. 390–99; here, p. 397.

6. Friedrich Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst I* (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt, 1976), pp. 7 and 124, respectively.

7. General problems of traditional aesthetics are discussed in Wolfgang Iser, “Traditionelle und moderne Ästhetik in ihrem Verhältnis zur Praxis der Kunst,” *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* XXVIII (1983): 264–86. For an alternative approach see Wolfgang Iser, *Ästhetisches Denken* (1990; repr., Stuttgart: Reclam, 1999).

— I
— O
— + I

8. By “reality” I mean here the life-world in which we find ourselves as well as the truths and facts that we hold to be valid in it. See Wolfgang Iser, “Aestheticization Processes: Phenomena, Distinctions, and Prospects,” in *Undoing Aesthetics* (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 1–32.

9. For further examples, such as genetic engineering, see Wolfgang Iser, “Ange-sichts des Verschwindens von Geist, Kultur und Kunst in der Fun-Gesellschaft,” in *Im Spannungsfeld zweier Kulturen. Eine Auseinandersetzung zwischen Geistes- und Naturwissenschaft, Kunst und Technik*, ed. Karen Gloy (Würzburg, Germany: Königshausen and Neumann, 2002), pp. 117–32.

10. See “The ‘Oldest System-Programme’ of German Idealism,” in *Hegel Selections*, ed. M. J. Inwood (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 86–87.

11. See Wolfgang Iser, “Ästhetik und Anästhetik,” in *Ästhetisches Denken*, (1990; repr., Stuttgart: Reclam, 1999), pp. 9–40.

12. Cf. Wolfgang Iser, “Contemporary Art in Public Space—Feast for the Eyes or Annoyance?” in *Undoing Aesthetics*, pp. 118–22.

13. Rainer Maria Rilke, *Duineser Elegien*, in *Sämtliche Werke*, 6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Insel, 1955–1966), vol. 1, p. 685 (first elegy).

14. See Wolfgang Iser, “Artificial Paradises? Considering the World of Electronic Media—and Other Worlds,” in *Undoing Aesthetics*, pp. 168–90.

15. By “media,” I mean mostly electronic media and primarily television, which, although it has become an old-fashioned medium, is still the one everybody knows and uses.

16. In recent years, media theory, not aesthetics, has begun to take on a great part of this task.

17. See Martin Jay’s survey *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

18. For more details see Wolfgang Iser, “On the Way to an Auditive Culture?” in *Undoing Aesthetics*, pp. 150–67.

19. Cf. Derrick de Kerckhove, “Touch versus Vision: Ästhetik neuer Technologien,” in *Die Aktualität des Ästhetischen*, ed. Wolfgang Iser (Munich: Fink, 1993), pp. 137–68.

20. See Aristotle’s outline of the many uses of *to on* in Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, vol. 7, ed. W. Jaeger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957). Aristotle’s point here is precisely that such a weak resemblance is completely sufficient for the realization of a science that can refer to all the different senses of being (i.e., metaphysics).

21. George Steiner has shown how much of our amorous behavior and rhetoric has been formed by generations of artistic models. See George Steiner, *Real Presences: Is There Anything in What We Say?* (London: Faber and Faber, 1989).

22. Rainer Maria Rilke, “Archaischer Torso Apollos,” in *Sämtliche Werke* 1 (1976): 557.

23. Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Robert Hullor-Kentor (1970; repr., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 158.

24. Paul Klee had already in 1915 noted a connection of this type in another way: “The more shocking this world (just as today), the more abstract the art, whereas a happy world produces a worldly art.” From Paul Klee, *Tagebücher* (Cologne: DuMont, 1957), p. 323.

25. I first presented the following arguments in my essay, “Erweiterungen der Ästhetik—eine Replik,” in *Bild und Reflexion*, ed. Birgit Recki and Lambert Wiesing (Munich: Fink, 1997), pp. 39–67.

26. The painting’s transgression beyond the museum’s threshold was not just metaphorical. In the 1930s, antifascist demonstrators in Paris carried placards that showed Goya’s picture.

27. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 349.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Guillaume Apollinaire declared in 1913: “Above all, artists are people who want to become inhuman. They arduously seek traces of inhumanity.” From Guillaume Apollinaire, “Méditations esthétiques. Les Peintres cubistes” (1913), in *Œuvres en prose complètes*, II (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 3–52; here, p. 8 (section “Sur la peinture”). Maurice Merleau-Ponty saw “Cézanne’s painting” reveal “the ground of inhuman nature on which the human settles.” From Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Le Doute de Cézanne,” in *Sens et non-sens* (1948; repr., Paris: Nagel, 1966), pp. 15–44; here, p. 28. And Adorno famously declared that “art is loyal to humanity only through inhumanity toward it.” From Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 197.

30. For examples see Wolfgang Welsch, “Art Transcending the Human Pale—Towards a Transhuman Stance,” *International Yearbook of Aesthetics*, vol. 5, ed. Kin-ichi Sasaki (2001): 3–23.

31. Remember Denis Diderot’s famous claim that “man is the unique concept from which we must start and to which we must refer everything back.” From Denis Diderot, “Encyclopédie” (1755), in *Œuvres complètes*, vol. VII: Encyclopédie III (Paris: Hermann, 1976), pp. 174–262; here, p. 212.

32. It is no coincidence that many Western artists interested in these issues were inspired by Eastern art and thinking. John Cage used the Chinese I Ching as an aleatory device (e.g., in his *Music of Changes* from 1951); from 1947 onward he had studied Zen Buddhism with Daisetz T. Suzuki. Morton Feldman liked to compare his long pieces to Asian rugs. Cf. Morton Feldman, “Crippled Symmetry,” in *Give My Regards to Eighth Street: Collected Writings of Morton Feldman*, ed. B. H. Friedman (Cambridge, MA: Exact Change, 2000), pp. 134–49.

33. Already in Adorno we read: “Modified aesthetics . . . no longer considers, as did traditional aesthetics, the concept of art to be its obvious correlate. Aesthetic thinking today, in conceiving art, would have to go beyond it.” From Theodor W. Adorno, “Funktionalismus heute,” in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 10.1 (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1977), pp. 375–95; here, p. 395.

34. Especially neuroaesthetics and evolutionary aesthetics have lately provided new methods and approaches. See Wolfgang Welsch, “Animal Aesthetics,” *Contemporary*

Aesthetics (2004). Available at <http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=243> (accessed September 19, 2007).

35. This suggestion of a transdisciplinary structure for aesthetics might seem too radical. However, in my view, almost every discipline today requires such a structure. This has been driven by fundamental changes in our understanding of the structure of rationalities, which legitimately demand alterations in the design of research fields and research objects. It has become obvious that diverse rationalities cannot clearly be delimited because they exhibit in their core entanglements and transitions that undercut traditional departmentalizations. See Wolfgang Iser, *Vernunft. Die zeitgenössische Vernunftkritik und das Konzept der transversalen Vernunft* (1995; repr., Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp, 2007).

36. Consider, for example, the founding of the Asian Society for Aesthetics in 2001 and the increased number of publications on intercultural aesthetics in the West, such as R. Elberfeld and G. Wohlfart, ed., *Komparative Ästhetik* (Cologne: Edition Chora, 2000); G. Marchianò and R. Milani, ed., *Frontiers of Transculturality in Contemporary Aesthetics* (Turin, Italy: Trauben, 2001); K. Higgins, “Comparative Aesthetics,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 679–92; Crispin Sartwell, *Six Names of Beauty* (New York: Routledge, 2004). The theme of the 2007 congress of the International Association for Aesthetics in Ankara, Turkey, was “Aesthetics Bridging Cultures.”

Chapter 13

1. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, ed. Raymund Schmidt (Hamburg, Germany: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976). Page citations in the text follow the standard A and B Edition paginations. Translations from the German are mine.

2. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, ed. Karl Vorländer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1974).

3. *Samkhya Karika of Isvara Krsna*, trans. Swami Virupakshananda (Madras, India: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1995). A particularly faithful appropriation into Yoga psychology can be found in *Yoga Philosophy of Patanjali*, trans. [from Sanskrit] Swami Hariharananda Aranya and [into English] P. N. Mukerji (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983). For a more reader-friendly but less rigorous approach see *Yogasutra of Patanjali with the Commentary of Vyasa*, trans. Bangali Baba (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982). Two very friendly popularizations are *How to Know God: The Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali*, trans. Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood (New York: Mentor, 1969); and *Yoga, Discipline of Freedom: The Yoga Sutra Attributed to Patanjali*, trans. Barbara Stoler Miller (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).

4. See my detailed discussion of Kant’s notion of concepts as functions in Adrian Piper, “Kant on the Objectivity of the Moral Law,” in *Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls*, ed., Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Christine M. Korsgaard (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 240–69. Also see Adrian Piper,

Kant's Metaethics: First Critique Foundations (in press), from which both this chapter and the present discussion are excerpted.

5. I discuss the logical status of Kant's categories and the distinction between transcendental and empirical concepts at greater length in Adrian Piper, "Xenophobia and Kantian Rationalism," *Philosophical Forum XXIV*, 1–3 (1992–1993): 188–232. Reprinted in Robin May Schott, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 21–73; and in John P. Pittman, ed., *African-American Perspectives and Philosophical Traditions* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

Chapter 14

1. The following section first appeared, in a different form, as "The Obscene Body/ Politic" *Art Journal* 50, no. 4 (1991): 28–35.

2. For current statistics check the Web site of the Child and Woman Abuse Study Unit, UK, at http://www.cwasu.org/page_display.asp?pageid=STATS&pagekey=35&itemkey=37 and the Web site for the U.S. Department of Justice at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvict_c.htm.

3. Phrase adapted from book title. See Anaïs Nin, *A Spy in the House of Love* (Paris: British Book Centre, 1954).

4. From Carolee Schneemann, *More Than Meat Joy: Complete Performance Works and Selected Writings* (Kingston, NY: McPherson & Co., 1979, 1997).

5. By 2007 this proportion is utterly transformed. Overt sexuality, necrophilia, nudity, animal corpses, and outrageous images provide desired commodifications for glamorous and challenging investment values.

Chapter 15

1. Noam Chomsky, *Language and Thought* (Wakefield, RI: Moyer Bell, 1993), p. 35.

2. Justus Buchler, ed., *Philosophical Writings of Peirce* ed. Justus Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), p. 62.

3. Bertrand Russell, *Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 76.

4. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987), p. lxxi.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 147.

8. See Donald Davidson, "Reality Without Reference," in *Truth and Interpretation*, ed. Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 215–24.

9. Chomsky, *Language and Thought*, p. 22.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

11. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. P.H. Nidditch and L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

12. Immanuel Kant, *A Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Modern Library, 1958), pp. 110–11.

13. Michael Dummett, *Origins of Analytic Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 15.

14. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: MacMillan, 1953).

15. Kenneth Surin, “Getting the Picture: Donald Davidson on Robert Morris’s Blind Time Drawings IV (Drawing with Davidson),” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 101, no. 1 (2002): 164.

16. Donald Davidson, “A Nice Arrangement of Epitaphs,” *Truth and Interpretation*, ed. Ernest LePore (New York: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 433–36.

17. See T. J. Clark’s brilliant remarks on cubism in his *Farewell to an Idea* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 187, and throughout chapt. 4.

18. Colin M. Turnbull, *The Forest People* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961), p. 75.

19. Dialogue between Marcel Duchamp, William Rubin, and Alfred Barris is cited from memory of a 1964 panel discussion at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City.

20. Thierry de Duve, *Kant After Duchamp* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).

21. One only need recall Filippo Marinetti’s and fascism’s glorification of war, which, as Walter Benjamin has reminded us, “can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order.” See Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in *Illuminations*, trans. H. Zohn, intro. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 242.

22. Robert Morris, “From a Chomskian Couch: The Imperialistic Unconscious,” *Critical Inquiry* 29 (Summer 2003): 683.

23. I had thought Eric Hobsbawm had made this remark, but my search through his work did not turn up the quote. It is possible that I’ve imagined he said it.

24. Cf. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*.

25. Jonathan Crary, *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990).

26. See W.J.T. Mitchell, “The Pictorial Turn,” in *Picture Theory* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994), pp. 11–34.

27. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes* (New York: Vintage, 1994), p. 513.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 513.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 520.

30. See Arthur Danto, “The End of Art,” in *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 81–115. Hegel’s philosophy of history did of course greatly influence political theory. But most of Hegel’s doctrines are patently false. See Bertrand Russell’s satirical remarks on Hegel’s notions of the “whole” in *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), pp. 732–33.

31. See Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1976); and W.J.T. Mitchell’s incisive analysis of Goodman’s thought in W.J.T. Mitchell, *Iconology*

(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986), pp. 63–74. I stray from Mitchell’s critique of Goodman’s formalism in my remarks here.

32. Mitchell, *Iconology*, p. 69.

33. What may never be made clear by cognitive science is how the interface between the visual and verbal operates, not only in terms of the seamless connection that facilitates the interchange between what is seen and said, but the complex and endless conflict between the one and the other. “Reading” is of course the wrong word for this processing of the visual. The fact that it is in play indicates a lag in theorizing the complexities of what Mitchell has called the “pictorial turn.”

34. Already Richard Wolin notes how Walter Benjamin (writing “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” in the late 1930s) “laments the fact that in the modern world the powers of consciousness must be enhanced as a defense against the shocks of everyday life (a problem that is especially acute in the modern metropolis, the locus classicus of shock experience). As a result of this need for constantly vigilant consciousness, our natural and spontaneous capacities for experience are necessarily diminished.” Richard Wolin, *Labyrinths* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995), p. 68.

35. See Michel Foucault’s remarks on *Las Meninas*, which open his book, *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage, 1973), pp. 3–6; his remarks unpack the Velazquez by subjecting its surface to an inch by inch analysis. There could be no more relentless pursuit of differences across an image. That its most every difference is a difference in relation to a standard, “classical” space that stands outside the work’s representations speaks not only to Velazquez’s historical moment before representation had swallowed the world, but to that of Foucault’s, when the perception of such densities was still available.

36. See John Dewey, *Art and Experience* (New York: Perigee, 1934).

37. See Morris, “From a Chomskian Couch,” for a development of this argument.

38. Stanley Cavell, *In Quest of the Ordinary* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998), p. 84.

39. Here da Vinci takes the other side, valorizing the visual over the verbal: “If you, poet, describe the figure of some deities, the writing will not be held in the same veneration as the painted deity, because bows and various prayers will continually be made to the painting. To it will throng many generations from many provinces and from over the eastern seas, and they will demand help from the painting and not from what is written.” Leonardo da Vinci, *Treatise on Painting*, trans. A. Philip McMahon, introd. Ludwig H. Heydenreich. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 22.

Chapter 16

1. Nicolas Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics* (Dijon, France: Presses du Réel, 1998), p. 14.

2. As the art historian Grant Kester observes, art is uniquely placed to counter a world in which “we are reduced to an atomized pseudo-community of consumers, our sensibilities dulled by spectacle and repetition.” From Grant Kester, *Conversation Pieces: Community and Communication in Modern Art* (Berkeley: University of California Press,

2004), p. 29. This trope is also found in Bourriaud: “art is the place that produces a specific sociability” because “it *tightens the space of relations*, unlike TV.” From Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics*, p. 18.

3. Jeanne van Heeswijk, “Fleeting Images of Community,” <http://www.jeanetworks.net> (accessed April 25, 2008).

4. Kester, *Conversation Pieces*, p. 112.

5. See Andrew Brighton, “Consumed by the Political: The Ruination of the Arts Council,” *Critical Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (2006): 4.

6. See Ruth Levitas, *The Inclusive Society? Social Exclusion and New Labour* (Basingstoke, UK: MacMillan, 1998).

7. Charles Esche, “Superhighrise: Community, Technology, Self-Organisation,” <http://www.superflex.net/text/articles/superhighrise.shtml> (accessed April 25, 2008).

8. François Matarasso, *Use or Ornament? The Social Impact of Participation in the Arts* (London: Comedia, 1997).

9. Paola Merli, “Evaluating the Social Impact of Participation in Arts Activities,” *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 8, no. 1 (2002): 107–18.

10. Reinaldo Laddaga, “From Forcing to Gathering: On Liisa Robert’s ‘What’s the Time in Vyborg?’” unpublished manuscript, p. 1. *What’s the Time in Vyborg?* (2001–2005) comprised a series of workshops, exhibitions, performances, films, and events carried out around the still-ongoing restoration of the city library that Alvar Aalto designed and built in 1939.

11. For a full list of projects, see <http://www.odaprojesi.org>.

12. Oda Projesi in Claire Bishop, “What We Made Together,” *Untitled* 33 (Spring 2005): 22.

13. Maria Lind, “Actualisation of Space,” in Claire Doherty, *Contemporary Art: From Studio to Situation* (London: Black Dog, 2004), pp. 109–21.

14. Lind, “Actualisation of Space,” pp. 114–15.

15. Lucy Lippard, *The Lure of the Local* (New York: The New Press, 1998), pp. 286–90.

16. Erik Hagoort, *Good Intentions: Judging the Art of Encounter* (Amsterdam: Netherlands Foundation for Visual Arts, Design and Architecture, 2005), pp. 54–55.

17. Kester, *Conversation Pieces*, p. 24.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

19. Peter Dews, “Uncategorical Imperatives: Adorno, Badiou and the Ethical Turn,” *Radical Philosophy* 111 (Jan/Feb 2002): 33.

20. See Alain Badiou, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil* (London: Verso, 2001); Slavoj Žižek, “Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism,” *New Left Review* (Sept–Oct 1997); and Slavoj Žižek, “Against Human Rights,” *New Left Review* 34 (Jul–Aug 2005): 115–31. See also Jacques Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy* (London: Verso, 2006).

21. Gillian Rose, “Social Utopianism—Architectural Illusion,” in *The Broken Middle* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 306.

22. As a consequence, the participants of collaborative art seem always to be vulnerable creatures, constantly at risk of being misunderstood or exploited.

23. Art has a “relatively autonomous position, which provides a sanctuary where new things can emerge,” writes Jeanne van Heeswijk. From Jeanne van Heeswijk, “Fleeting Images of Community,” <http://www.jeannetworks.net> (accessed April 25, 2008). “The world of culture is *the only space left* for me to do what I can do, there’s nothing else,” says the Chilean artist Alfredo Jaar. From Alfredo Jaar, unpublished interview with the author, May 9, 2005.

24. See Jörg Heiser, “False Alternatives: Critique and Hedonism in the Art of the 1990s,” in *Zusammenhänge herstellen/Contextualise* (Hamburger: Kunstverein / Cologne: DuMont, 2003), p. 171.

25. Jacques Rancière, “The Aesthetic Revolution and Its Outcomes,” *New Left Review* 14 (March–April 20002): 133–51; and Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics* (London: Continuum, 2004).

26. Jacques Rancière, “The Emancipated Spectator,” *Artforum* (March 2007): 271–80.

27. “On the one hand, the futurist and constructivist dream of art’s self-suppression in the formation of a new sensible world; on the other hand, the fight to preserve the autonomy of art from all forms of aestheticization of business and power; to preserve it not only as the pure pleasure of art for art’s sake but, on the contrary, as an inscription of the unresolved contradiction between the aesthetic promise and the reality of a world of oppression.” From Jacques Rancière, *Malaise dans l’Esthétique* (Paris: Editions Galilée, 2004), p. 169; author’s translation.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

29. Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, p. 63.

30. Rancière, *Malaise dans l’Esthétique*, p. 67.

31. See David Callaghan, “Still Signaling Through the Flames: The Living Theatre’s Use of Audience Participation in the 1990s,” in *Audience Participation: Essays on Inclusion in Performance*, ed. Susan Kattwinkel (Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), pp. 23–36.

32. Rancière suggests that the exemplary ethical gesture is a strategic obfuscation of the political and the aesthetic: “By replacing matters of class conflict by matters of inclusion and exclusion, [contemporary art] puts worries about the ‘loss of the social bond,’ concerns with ‘bare humanity’ or tasks of empowering threatened identities in the place of political concerns. Art is summoned thus to put its political potentials at work in re-framing a sense of community, mending the social bond, etc. Once more, politics and aesthetics vanish together in Ethics.” From Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, <http://theater.kein.org/node/99> (accessed June 21, 2007).

33. This view of performance has been most influentially advanced by Peggy Phelan in *Unmarked: The Politics of Performance* (London: Routledge, 1993).

34. See for example Philip Auslander, *Liveness: Performances in a Mediatized Culture* (London: Routledge, 1999).

35. “The less the dramaturge knows what the spectators must do as a collective, the more he knows that they *must* become a collective, turn their mere agglomeration into

the community that they virtually are.” From Rancière, “The Emancipated Spectator,” pp. 277–78.

36. See Rancière, interview with François Ewald, “Qu’est-ce que la classe ouvrière?” in *Magazine Littéraire* 175 (Jul–Aug 1981), which is cited in Kristin Ross’s introduction to Jacques Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. xviii.

37. Jacques Rancière, *The Philosopher and His Poor* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 188.

38. Rancière, *The Philosopher and His Poor*, p. 189.

39. In Rancière’s system, the aesthetic regime of art is preceded by two other regimes. The first is an “ethical regime of images,” which is governed by the twofold question of the truth-content of images and the uses to which they are put—in other words, their effects and ends. Central to this regime is Plato’s denigration of mimesis. The second is the “representative regime of the arts,” a regime of visibility by which the fine arts are classified according to a logic of what can be done and made in each art, a logic that corresponds to the overall hierarchy of social and political occupations. This regime is essentially Aristotelian but stretches to the academy system of the fine arts and its hierarchy of the genres. The aesthetic regime of art, ushered in with the Enlightenment, continues today.

40. Rancière, “The Aesthetic Revolution and Its Outcomes,” p. 150.

Chapter 17

I would like to thank Tony O’Connor, Francis Halsall, and Julia Jansen for organizing the 2004 “(Re)Discovering Aesthetics” conference at University College, Cork, Ireland. I would also like to thank the hosts and audiences at the University of Delaware (Art History), Vanderbilt University (Philosophy), and the University of California at Santa Cruz (Art History) where I presented earlier versions of this chapter.

1. Gerhard Richter, *The Daily Practice of Painting: Writings and Interviews 1962–1993*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Obrist, trans. David Britt (London: Anthony d’Offray Gallery 308/ Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 163, 202.

2. I prefer to speak of a “regeneration” of aesthetics because rediscovery may sound like a restoration of the status quo ante. By contrast, it is crucial to recognize that aesthetics is in need of regeneration because it has been subjected to severe, sometimes justified, modernist and postmodernist critiques motivated by a host of philosophical, political, cultural, and other concerns that have been well documented elsewhere.

3. I also think it is important to emphasize that aesthetics (critical thinking about art, culture, and nature) involves much more than beauty, and that beauty itself is much more than its critics have typically taken it to be. The four-volume *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics*, ed. Michael Kelly (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) amply documents that the history of aesthetics involves many more issues than beauty. For compelling and varied accounts of the roles and purposes of beauty in modern and contemporary art, see

the recent works of Arthur C. Danto, Umberto Eco, Paul Guyer, Alexander Nehamas, Elizabeth Prettejohn, Elaine Scarry, and Wendy Steiner.

4. Many would discount Richter's (or any artist's) writings about his work on the grounds that they are self-serving or misleading, that the artist's intentions are not to be privileged, or, stronger, that the artist (as author) is dead. By contrast, I think artists' writings are part of a larger body of evidence that we need to consult when we try to understand any art. More than evidence to be taken up by a philosopher or theorist, the artist's words are philosophical. As Gilles Deleuze says about directors who also write about cinema (e.g., Jean-Luc Godard), painters talking about painting "become something else, they become philosophers or theoreticians" and, in that role, they "talk best about what they do," which is why he asserts in his book on Francis Bacon that "we do not listen enough to what painters say." From Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 280; and Constantin V. Boundas, ed., *The Deleuze Reader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 193.

5. For a clear example of an antiaesthetic interpretation of Richter's work, see Benjamin Buchloh's 1986 interview with Richter, reprinted in Richter, *The Daily Practice of Painting*, pp. 132–65.

6. For images of the Baader-Meinhof series, please search Google images or consult the Robert Storr book cited in footnote 30 below. For a history of the Baader-Meinhof Group, see the video *Germany in Autumn [Deutschland im Herbst]* by Heinrich von Böll et al. (1978; Los Angeles: World Artists Home Video, 1994). See also Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). Later generations of the Baader-Meinhof Group were active as late as 1998, although the last major event was in 1991 at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn during the first Iraq War. According to Varon, forty-three people had been killed in connection with the Baader-Meinhof violence by late 1978: Twenty-eight were victims and fifteen were group members. From Varon, *Bringing the War Home*, p. 198.

7. Astrid Proll left the RAF in 1971; she went to England, where she was captured and extradited in 1978 and imprisoned until 1988.

8. "I was unable to look at [the pictures of dead comrades] for many years." From Astrid Proll, ed., *Baader-Meinhof Pictures on the Run 67–77* (New York: Scalo, 1998), p. 7.

9. Richter, *The Daily Practice of Painting*, p. 207.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 189; emphasis added.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 203. Richter does say, however, that when he started the *Baader-Meinhof* series he envisioned something that had more to do with "the subjects' lives." From *Ibid.*, p. 209. His focus and aim changed as he worked on the paintings, for reasons he does not explain.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 205.

—-I
—O
—+I

15. Although the Vietnam War was over by 1977, the other issues taken up by the Baader-Meinhof Group, which were more particular to West Germany—such as the Nazi backgrounds of some business and political leaders and questions of social and economic justice—proved to be more intractable.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 173; emphasis added.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 174, 175, 189, 190, 200.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 190; see also p. 200.

21. John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1934), p. 91.

22. Richter, *The Daily Practice of Painting*, p. 84; emphasis added.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 174, 198, 205.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 197–98.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

27. Gertrud Koch, “The Richter Scale of Blur,” *October* 62 (Fall 1992): 133–42; here, p. 142.

28. This reaction is evident in the comments made by some critics of the *Baader-Meinhof* series. For example, Hilton Kramer accused Richter of making heroes or martyrs out of the terrorists, as if he were promoting the cause of the Baader-Meinhof Group. Hilton Kramer, “Telling Stories, Denying Style: Reflections on MoMA 2000,” *New Criterion* 19, no. 5 (January 2001): 4. But I presume these same critics would never say that the *photographs* of the Baader-Meinhof deaths made heroes out of the group. So what explains the alleged celebratory effect of Richter *paintings*, especially given the blurring issue?

29. Koch, “The Richter Scale of Blur,” p. 142.

30. Several critics and historians interpret Richter’s *Baader-Meinhof* paintings as history paintings. See, for example, Benjamin Buchloh’s ; and Robert Storr’s *Gerhard Richter: October* 18, 1977 (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2000). But this type of interpretation seems to distance Richter’s paintings from the contemporary political experience they are trying to render bearable and intelligible.

31. Evidence of the contemporaneity of the Baader-Meinhof Group is the controversy that erupted in February 2007 when the German court decided to release Brigitte Mohnhaupt, one of the Baader-Meinhof members who has served twenty-four years in prison for her involvement in several murders. (She was imprisoned in the 1970s but released in 1977, only to become the leader for about seven years before returning to prison.)

32. See Storr, *Gerhard Richter: October* 18, 1977.

33. Richter, *The Daily Practice of Painting*, p. 226.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 189–90.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

36. Gregg Horowitz, *Sustaining Loss: Art and Mournful Life* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 141 and 156.

37. Quoted in Storr, *Gerhard Richter: October 18, 1977*, p. 140. For his part, Storr claims that “in photographs we can see death with a nakedness no other medium affords. But photography does not allow us to *contemplate* death.” From Storr, p. 242; emphasis added.

38. Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Farrar Strauss & Giroux, 1981), pp. 34 and 85.

39. Desa Philippi, “Moments of Interpretation,” *October* 62 (Fall 1992): 115–22; here, p. 122.

40. Rainer Rochlitz, “‘Where We Have Got To,’” in Rainer Rochlitz, Benjamin Buchloh, Jean-Francois Chevrier, and Armin Zweite, *Photography and Painting in the Work of Gerhard Richter: Four Essays on Atlas* (Catalan: Museu d’Art Contemporani de Barcelona, 2000), pp. 103–25; here, p. 120, emphasis added.

41. Varon, *Bringing the War Home*, p. 254.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 263.

43. Quoted in Storr, *Gerhard Richter: Doubt and Belief in Painting* (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2003), p. 56.



-I—
O—
+I—

